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The New
Superorganic1
by F. Allan Hanson
Despite proposals by Kroeber and others that society and culture
represent a distinct level of reality, the prevailing opinion has
been that they are abstractions from the behavior of individuals.
Recently that position, methodological individualism, has been
challenged on several fronts. Especially with the incorporation of
artificial intelligence into many aspects of social life, it is no
longer feasible to consider the ultimate unit of social action to
be the human individual. Bolstered with a case study of the con-
sequences of automation for the legal profession, the argument
here is that agency should be redefined in a more expansive and
dynamic manner that includes but is not limited to the
individual.
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New occasions teach new duties: Time makes an-
cient good uncouth.
—james russell lowell
As representatives of the most resolutely social of the
social sciences, many anthropologists and sociologists
have insisted that crucial properties of the human con-
dition emerge from the association among individuals.
Religion, mythology, morality, kinship, and other forms
of organization, political power, and much else cannot
be reduced to or fully explained in terms of individuals.
This position—call it “collectivism”—is opposed by
“methodological individualism.” It holds that collective
concepts such as Kroeber’s superorganic are only abstrac-
tions from the behavior of human individuals and, in its
most extreme form, that therefore the phenomena com-
monly called social and cultural should ultimately be
explained in psychological terms. Probably no one has
stated the methodological individualist view more
crisply than Anthony Flew (1995:61–62):
All social collectivities are composed of individuals,
and can act only through the actions of their compo-
nents. Whatever is said about any mass movement,
organized collectivity, or other supposed social
whole, must at some stage be related and in some
way reduced to discourse about the doings, beliefs,
attitudes, and dispositions of its components. Who
actually did and thought what; and what led them
to act and to think, as in fact they did, and not oth-
erwise? . . . All this, once it has been sharply stated,
should appear obvious and altogether beyond
dispute.
A more moderate position has been labeled “relational
methodological individualism” (Jones 2000:113). Essen-
tially it holds that society and culture do not represent
a new level of reality above that of human individuals
but that a full understanding of human behavior nev-
ertheless requires consideration of both the psychologi-
cal properties of individuals and the roles, relationships,
beliefs, understandings, and other products that stem
from their historical and ongoing social interactions.
Even those collectivists who have most stridently in-
sisted on viewing social and cultural facts in their own
right have ultimately acquiesced in this position or
something very similar to it. Emile Durkheim acknowl-
edged that society is composed exclusively of individuals
but insisted that the social whole is more than the sum
of its parts and must be analyzed in social terms (1938:
102–4). A. L. Kroeber allowed that “the social is resolv-
able through the . . . organic and psychic individual”
(1917:208) but held throughout his career that the man-
ifestations of culture or civilization (the result of his-
torical interaction among human beings) must be un-
derstood in terms of other cultural manifestations (p.
212; 1948:253–54; 1952). Leslie White and others main-
tained that collective concepts such as culture refer not
to a new level of reality but to a certain analytic per-
spective. The single reality in question is institutional-
ized human behavior. Addressing it in terms of what
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motivates individuals to engage in it is the stuff of in-
dividual or psychological analysis; asking how elements
of institutionalized behavior are related to each other
constitutes institutional or cultural analysis (White
1959:231; Kaplan 1965; Hanson 1975:1–7; Service 1985:
281–83).
Thus even among those who insisted on the necessity
of collective considerations for many explanatory pur-
poses, a consensus emerged granting the individual an
ontologically privileged position. The solid, concrete re-
alities in social life are human individuals and their ac-
tivities. However, numerous reports have been bruited
of late about the demise or adulteration of the individual,
in the light of which it has become anything but obvious
that individuals can any longer be taken as the sole stuff
of social and cultural being. One line of argument ques-
tions the historical standing of the individual as the es-
sential unit in human life. Another holds that the de-
velopment of artificial intelligence implies that agents
other than or in addition to human individuals are now
also authors of social and cultural action. After discuss-
ing these critiques of individualism, I will propose a
broader concept of agency that may be preferable to the
individual as the basic unit of behavior.
Decentering the Individual
Many scholars now regard the individual as the construct
of a particular era rather than a constant throughout his-
tory (Foucault 1980:117). Erich Fromm held that the in-
dividual was born in the Renaissance. “Medieval soci-
ety,” he wrote, “did not deprive the individual of his
freedom, because the ‘individual’ did not yet exist. . . .
[Man] did not yet conceive of himself as an individual
except through the medium of his social . . . role” (1941:
43, following Burckhardt 1954[1860]:100–101). Louis Al-
thusser also sees the individual as a contingent, con-
structed being. In his “Reply to John Lewis,” he argues
that the engine of history for Marxism-Leninism is not
“man” but the class struggle. Human nature is a variable
product of particular forms of social relations; the indi-
vidual as a transcendental agent struggling through his-
tory for freedom and independence is nothing more than
the concoction of bourgeois ideology (1976:46–54).
Even if of relatively recent origin, the individual may
already be in the twilight of its career. In their review
of the steps toward postmodernist social theory, Best
and Kellner stress the structuralists’ and poststructur-
alists’ increasingly radical rejection of humanistic as-
sumptions about the autonomous subject and unchang-
ing human nature (1991:19–20, 27). One prominent
theorist imagines that the individual may be disap-
pearing, “like a face, drawn in sand, at the edge of the
sea” (Foucault 1970:387).2
2. For a different perspective on the rise and fall of the individual,
see Kamenka and Tay’s (1975:129–42) contrast among three legal-
administrative traditions: Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, and bureau-
cratic-administrative.
Edward Said (2000:16; see also Kincaid 1997:2) explains
Foucault’s project in language, which simultaneously il-
luminates the grip of the individual on recent social the-
ory and identifies some of the sources of the growing
disenchantment with it:
Classical European philosophy from Descartes to
Kant had supposed that an objectively stable and
sovereign ego (as in “cogito ergo sum”) was both the
source and basis for all knowledge. Foucault’s work
not only disputes this but also shows how the sub-
ject is a construction laboriously put together over
time, and one very liable to be a passing historical
phenomenon replaced in the modern age by trans-
historical impersonal forces, like the capital of Marx
or the unconscious of Freud or the will of Nietzsche.
Elsewhere Said cites, in addition to Foucault, Le´vi-
Strauss, Barthes, and Lacan as also discerning the end of
the subject (1985:292–93), and one may add Deleuze and
Guattari (1983) as well.3
The individual is in trouble in more places than just
French philosophy. In Melanesia, aboriginal Australia,
and elsewhere, the person is defined as much by position
in a network of social relations as by individual traits
(Strathern and Stewart 1988, Wagner 1991, Myers 1986).
Methodological individualism is ill-suited to explaining
behavior in these circumstances. Contemporary theory
in a number of fields is shifting the unit of action and
analysis from the stable, Cartesian individual to fluid
information networks consisting of multiple human be-
ings plus various nonhuman elements. The psychologist
Kenneth Gergen suggests that “we may be entering a
new era of self-conception. In this era the self is redefined
as no longer an essence in itself, but relational” (1991:
146). “The concept of the individual self,” he continues,
“ceases to be intelligible. At this point one is prepared
for the new reality of relationship. Relationships make
possible the concept of the self. Previous possessions of
the individual self—autobiography, emotions, and mo-
rality—become possessions of relationships” (p. 170).
Psychologists and other social scientists have also
questioned the autonomy of the human individual via
the concept of distributed or socially shared cognition
(Resnick, Levine, and Teasley 1991, Derry, DuRussel,
and O’Donnel 1998, Moore and Rocklin 1998). Thus Jean
Lave analyzes learning not as individual acquisition by
individuals but as “a social phenomenon constituted in
the experienced, lived-in world” (1991:64), while Edwin
Hutchins painstakingly demonstrates that the compu-
tational process of navigating a ship can be fully under-
stood only in terms of teams of individuals coordinating
their several activities with each other and with various
technological instruments (1991, 1995). As Lucy Such-
man has put it, “humans and artifacts are mutually con-
stituted. . . . Agency—and associated accountabilities—
3. Terms such as “self,” “individual,” “subject,” and “ego” should
in some circumstances be carefully distinguished. That is not the
case here because I am concerned only with their common reference
to the individual human being.
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reside neither in us nor in our artifacts, but in our intra-
actions” (2000).
Yet another challenge to the centrality of the individ-
ual goes by the name of actor-network theory. As de-
veloped by students of science, technology, and society,
this theory attributes agency not to human individuals
but to networks, finite in duration and variable in com-
position, defined according to the activity under analysis
(Callon 1987:93; 1999:182–83; Law 1999:3–7; Latour
1987:84, 89; 1988). These actor networks include, in ad-
dition to human beings, a wide variety of nonhuman
components (Law 1991:10–11, 16–17; Star 1991:32–33).
Thus the network in play in John Law’s (1987) analysis
of fifteenth-century Portuguese exploration includes de-
signs of ships and the materials for constructing them,
navigation devices and techniques, prevailing winds and
currents, and the hospitality (or lack of it) of the inhab-
itants of the West African coast in addition to Portuguese
sailors. Distributed cognition and actor-network theory
are applicable at any time and place. However, only re-
cently has it become inescapably clear that the stable,
Cartesian individual is no longer tenable. What has
brought about this clarity is a series of developments in
technology.
For one thing, technology has breached boundaries and
caused formerly distinct entities quite literally to inter-
penetrate and flow into each other. One example is trans-
genic organisms. Tomatoes containing a gene from a
deep-water flounder are less susceptible to freezing, a
gene from the giant silk moth has been introduced into
potatoes to make them more resistant to disease, and
efforts are afoot to “splice carbon-based life forms to sil-
icon-based computer systems” (Haraway 1997:230, 216).
The increasingly intimate connections between humans
and nonhuman entities such as prosthetic devices and
machines (especially computers) and our growing depen-
dence on them are resulting in a similar kind of splicing
that transforms us into cyborgs: new kinds of beings
partly organic and partly mechanical. Far from the stable,
clearly defined, and bounded units that populate the tra-
ditional worldview, cyborgs are hybrid, indeterminate,
and ambiguous (Haraway 1991; Dumit and Davis-Floyd
1998:1).
David Gunkel holds that communication, which in-
volves multiple individuals and is often mediated by
electronic or other technological devices, has always
been the province of recombinant cyborgs (2000:340).
“Borg subjectivities . . . are not conceptualized as pre-
existing, selfsame, or self-determining individuals.
Rather, they are relational subjects constructed and re-
constructed based on the vicissitudes of the network.
. . . Borg subjects float, suspended between points of ob-
jectivity, being constituted and reconstituted in different
configurations in relation to the discursive arrangement
of the occasion” (p. 345). Similarly, Mark Poster per-
ceives in the shift from written to electronically medi-
ated communication a change in the subject from “an
agent centered in rational/imaginary autonomy” to one
that is “decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in contin-
uous instability” (1990:6). For example, the notion of the
unique author is fading as technological developments
such as word processing and hypertext make it easy to
modify written texts. These blur distinctions between
original author and readers, who are coming to be seen
as jointly exercising the role of author (Poster 1990:
114–15; 2001:91–94; Landow 1997:90). The learner, soft-
ware programmer, and computer all participate in the
operation of interactive instructional programs, which
pose different questions or tasks on the basis of the
learner’s performance on previous ones (Bolter 1991:6).
As a result of these developments, recent discussions
call for more flexibility in the definition and scope of
the unit of social scientific analysis than is possible un-
der methodological individualism. “It is necessary to re-
cast the objects of study, to no longer draw the boundary
of the field’s object at the human skin but treat humans
and their technologies as unitary entities. A range of
anthro-techno-science concepts (such as cyborgs and
Creolized Objects) can help to do this” (Hakken 1999:
224; see also Downey 1995:369). While this reconfigur-
ation may strain the tolerance of many social theorists
of the present generation, it is more natural to those of
the next. From their exposure to computer games and
educational programs, today’s children readily think of
digital entities as alive and are comfortable with inde-
terminate boundaries between organism and machine
(Turkle 1998).
Many social thinkers have acknowledged that social
interaction involves entities outside human individuals
but have still insisted that analysis should proceed in
terms of individuals because they are the control centers
where decision making (conscious or not) takes place.
As Elman Service characterized the thinking of Edward
Sapir on this point: “When we locate culture in the mind
and above all when we emphasize that it is the minds
of individuals—and what other minds are there?—we
must be suggesting that the true science of culture is
some form of psychology” (Service 1985:263). It is of
course true that no matter how elaborate the technology,
the vast majority of activity today is initiated and con-
trolled by individuals. But it is nevertheless important
to recognize that with the development of artificial in-
telligence, certain nonhuman agents make decisions and
engage in other intelligent activities. Knowledge-based
or expert systems are computer programs that do the
work of human experts, such as drawing up wills or di-
agnosing disease. Some applications can undertake a va-
riety of tasks without the participation of any human
being. Computers play chess not only against human
opponents but also against other computers, as when
Deep Junior won the right to meet Garry Kasparov by
defeating 18 other programs in a 2002 worldwide com-
petition (Gray 2003). Microsoft likens its message queue
server to “electronic mail, except senders and receivers
are application programs instead of people—and mes-
sages are data instead of electronic letters.” One of its
potential uses is to monitor stock in a retail outlet and
send orders to the warehouse distribution center, where
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another computer receives the orders and issues shipping
instructions, all without human input.4
In principle it would be possible to analyze activities
such as these in terms of the intentions and activities
of the humans who programmed the software (Bolter
1991:188). However, to do so would be intolerably time-
consuming, difficult, and futile (see Harris 1999:54).
With CAD-CAM (computer-assisted design, computer-
assisted manufacture), computers become instrumental
in making new computers. The line of derivation back
to the original work of human programmers becomes
longer, more convoluted, and harder to trace. It is getting
to the point where human beings are hard-pressed even
to understand the end product (Rawlins 1997:37). For
example, the widespread anxiety and flurry of activity
associated with Y2K (the idea that computers would be
unable to negotiate the date change to the year 2000),
the failure of any significant problem to materialize, and,
especially, the absence of any satisfactory explanation of
why it did not demonstrate how little humans under-
stand automation.
It is also becoming difficult to call upon initial human
programming to explain the behavior of artificial intel-
ligence systems that learn. Neural nets and genetic al-
gorithms, for example, learn “directly from data without
human intervention . . . by trawling through hundreds
or thousands of past transactions” (Goonatilake 1995:5).
After a certain period such a system may develop into
something quite different from its beginning. Consider
Tierra, a computer program designed by the biologist
Thomas Rey to simulate evolution by natural selection.
He began with a self-replicating digital creature consist-
ing of 80 instructions. Its progeny were designed to rep-
licate themselves with fewer instructions, being selected
for by using less CPU time in an environment where
that is a scarce resource. Over the generations and with
no further human intervention, the system produced
new, more efficient creatures. Small parasitic creatures
emerged that co-opted the features of larger ones. In re-
sponse, some of the host creatures developed immunity
to the first generation of parasites, following which new
parasites capable of penetrating the hosts’ defenses were
replicated. Rey, the original programmer, could not pre-
dict the developments that were taking place (Turkle
1998:321). To attempt to reduce the latter stages of such
a system to the intentions and decisions of the original
human programmer would be devilishly difficult, as well
as pointless.
Redefining the Subject
It follows from the foregoing review of diverse and ex-
panding developments that the human individual can no
longer be considered sufficient as the unit of sociocul-
tural action. The particular contribution I hope to make
is to propose a model that gives us a way of thinking
4. http://www.microsoft.com/NTServer/appservice/techdetails/
overview/msmqrevguide.asp.
about how artificial intelligence participates in units
that include but extend beyond the individual. I seek a
subject that is simultaneously concrete and dynamic:
made of tangible stuff and yet variable in composition
and duration, transcending the misleading distinction
between object and event altogether. In brief, I seek
something that combines the fluidity of actor networks
with the concreteness of the cyborg.
A good place to start looking is Gregory Bateson’s pro-
vocative insight that the agent conducting any activity
should be so defined as to include the lines of commu-
nication essential to that activity rather than cutting
across them. He instances a blind man using a stick to
walk down the street. The agent in this case should not
be limited to the man but include all the essential com-
municating components: the man, the stick, and the
street. Considered in this way, while it is clearly com-
posed of concrete components, agency is also fluid be-
cause its components vary with the particular activity
(Bateson 1972:459; see also Wood 1998; Hutchins 1995:
291–92). Thus when that same blind man reads a book
in Braille, the agent becomes the man and the raised
markings on the page.
The fluidity of agency should be brought out by iden-
tifying it not nominatively, as a collection of objects, but
verbally, as an embodied activity, such as “a man reading
a book in Braille.” Something of this fluidity may be con-
veyed by using the term “agency” in preference to words
with more nominative connotations such as “agent” or
“subject.” Agency acts intelligently; it manifests mind.
As with agency itself, “mind” should be understood as
more a verb than a noun, more a way of acting than an
object. This is the concept of mind advanced by the phi-
losopher Gilbert Ryle when, critiquing Cartesian dualism,
he redefined mind from a nominative “ghost in the ma-
chine” to the verbal concept of intelligent performance
(1949). Even earlier, the anthropologist Leslie White made
the same point when he argued that mind is “minding”:
not a thing but a way of behaving (1939).
Minding may be understood as the process of man-
aging information. This has two requirements. First,
there must be a repository that contains information
available for processing. We will refer to that as “mem-
ory.” Second, there must be procedures for processing
information: storing information in memory, retrieving
information from memory, and organizing, manipulat-
ing, and analyzing information in various ways. Infor-
mation processing is carried out by “intelligence.” Many
kinds of beings have memory and process information,
including animals and plants. Here we are interested in
just two kinds of memory and intelligence. “Human
memory” holds information in human minds, while “ar-
tificial memory” refers to other repositories that store
information: handwritten and printed texts, graphic im-
ages, electronic databases, and so on.5 Symmetrically,
5. From ancient times through the Renaissance the term “artificial
memory” referred to “the art of memory,” that is, the cultivated
or trained memory, as contrasted with “natural memory” that
everyone has from birth (Yates 1966:5). In the terminology I am
using, that sense of “artificial memory” is part of human memory.
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“human intelligence” refers to information processing
that is conducted by human beings, while “artificial in-
telligence” is the province of mechanical information-
processing devices. Preeminent among these today, of
course, are computers.
The Modes and Evolution of Information
Management
These distinctions between types of memory and intel-
ligence can be used to identify three modes of infor-
mation management. In the oral mode, information
stored in human memory is processed by human intel-
ligence. In the textual mode, human intelligence pro-
cesses information stored in artificial memory. And in
the automated mode, artificial intelligence processes in-
formation stored in artificial memory. All three modes
are fully active today and regularly work in combination
with each other, and probably the bulk of information
management is still conducted in the oral mode. Nev-
ertheless, there is an evolutionary or historical aspect to
them. The oral mode has existed for as long as we have
been human. For by far the greatest part of the history
of our species, extending well into the twentieth century
for nonliterate societies, it stood virtually alone. Pro-
cessing information stored in human memory with hu-
man intelligence, individuals combined their different
knowledges and skills for purposes of getting food, find-
ing shelter, defending themselves, entertaining them-
selves, understanding the world, defining their relation-
ship to the supernatural, and so on. In the process they
settled the entire globe and developed the astounding
richness and diversity that characterizes human cul-
tures. Some limited artificial memory existed in the form
of bodily adornments, rock drawings, and other artworks,
but it is difficult to imagine the existence of any artificial
intelligence at all during that long period.
The textual mode of information management became
a significant factor when the development of writing en-
abled the storage of large amounts of information in ar-
tificial memory, and it received a major boost some 550
years ago with the invention of printing with movable
type. Written records greatly facilitated trade and bu-
reaucratic administration and were therefore pivotal in
the accumulation of wealth and the rise of cities and
states. Writing also stimulated the development of phi-
losophy, science, and scholarship of all descriptions.
Modest beginnings of artificial intelligence can be
traced to devices such as the abacus and the Jacquard
loom, but the explosion of the automated mode of man-
aging information began in 1844 with the invention of
the telegraph and continued with the later inventions of
the telephone, radio, and television and, only in the past
few decades, widespread use of computers. This has
transformed and expedited global communication and
the management of large quantities of information to
such a degree that even people who lived most of their
lives in the precomputer age wonder how we ever got
along without them. Human beings are of course re-
sponsible for the development of artificial intelligence,
but they have developed it so well that it now excels
human intelligence in certain kinds of information pro-
cessing, such as searching large bodies of data for specific
items, mathematical calculation, and the solution of
complex problems governed by multiple rules (Baldi
2001:92–93). Future advances in artificial intelligence
will doubtless enable it to rival or surpass human intel-
ligence in other areas as well.
Extended Agency
The advent of the automated mode of information man-
agement has serious consequences for the theoretical is-
sue of agency. Methodological individualism serves rea-
sonably well for the oral and textual modes because in
both of them the information processor is human intel-
ligence. Although it is necessary to take into account
the interactions of multiple individuals in the oral mode,
information stored outside human minds in the textual
mode, and various kinds of technologies in both of them,
it is still possible to argue that evaluation, motivation,
and decisions for action in both of those modes are ul-
timately explicable in terms of the behavior of individual
human beings. But this is not true of the automated
mode, where artificial rather than human intelligence
evaluates information and determines action. Little if
any social action is conducted entirely in the automated
mode, but increasingly the automated mode is repre-
sented along with the oral and textual modes. Actions
that include the automated mode cannot be explained
entirely in terms of the decisions and dispositions of
individual human beings, and their analysis therefore
requires a concept of agency that takes artificial intel-
ligence into account. I call such a concept “extended
agency.”
The agencies that undertake activities are combina-
tions of human and artificial memory, human and arti-
ficial intelligence, and it is useful to sort out the roles
of each. In the case of a student using an online catalog
to find a book in a library, for example, human intelli-
gence consists of the student deciding to look up a par-
ticular book and knowing how to manipulate the com-
puter to do so. Information stored in human memory
includes the author or title of the book, why it is desired,
and so forth. Artificial memory refers to the library’s
database, which holds information regarding the mate-
rials it owns. Artificial intelligence is what the computer
hardware and software do to connect the student with
information in artificial memory: processing the input
about the author’s name or the title entered by the stu-
dent into an output of call number, location, availability,
and other information about the book.
Agency, as I have said, is temporary in duration and
variable in composition. If, for example, after checking
out the book the student telephones a friend to discuss
it, a different agency is in play, including some but not
all of the components of the first together with some
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additional ones. Here human intelligence is represented
by the information-processing activities of the two peo-
ple in the give-and-take of their conversation, and human
memory contains what either or both of them know
about the contents of the book and about other relevant
facts and concepts. Artificial memory refers to the book
itself or written notes that one or both of them may have
at hand in the course of the conversation, and artificial
intelligence is the operation of the telephone system as
it encodes the voices, transmits the signals, and decodes
them into a form recognizable at the receiver as human
speech.
The dynamic, recombinant quality of this concept of
agency is consistent with the view of the world rec-
ommended by relativity and quantum theory. From that
perspective, according to the physicist David Bohm, ev-
erything is an unbroken flow of movement in which
supposedly concrete and durable things such as observer
and observed are only relatively invariant forms of move-
ment that come together for a time to form wholes and
then flow apart from each other into other wholes (Bohm
1980:xi, 47). “Complexity science,” as represented by
chaos theory, fractal geometry, and molecular biology,
entails a similar view (Downey and Rogers 1995:271;
Dillon 2000:9). Michael Dillon describes it in terms of
“radical relationality”—the notion that everything ex-
ists as temporary, recombinant relationships. This view
does not allow for unequivocal definitions and distinc-
tions, as between machine and organism or the human
and the nonhuman. What might be called slippages, de-
formations, or contamination from another perspective
are not anomalous on this view but ordinary examples
of how things work (2000:4, 12–13).
The agencies responsible for social action do indeed
consist of temporary, recombinant relationships. Varying
combinations of human and artificial intelligence, hu-
man and artificial memory, have become commonplace
in contemporary life. They are in play whenever one
withdraws cash from an ATM, makes a telephone call,
communicates by e-mail, visits web sites, purchases
something on the Internet or at the supermarket, and so
on, through a myriad of everyday activities. The decisive
theoretical break is that it is no longer possible to reduce
social action to an invariable prime mover such as, in
methodological individualism, the human individual.
The concept of agency that I propose differs from meth-
odological individualism in two fundamental ways. First,
as I have argued at some length, it is variable, differently
composed in different circumstances. Second, it is su-
perorganic in that its decision-making (information-pro-
cessing) activity often includes elements of artificial in-
telligence that are not reducible to human intelligence.
It is, however, a new superorganic because it does not
recapitulate earlier notions of the superorganic such as
groups considered as entities apart from their members
or as a reification of cultural beliefs and values. It refers
instead to the empirical agencies that undertake social
action. Although variable in composition, temporary in
duration, and better understood as conjunctions for ac-
tion than as fixed objects, these agencies are no less con-
crete than human beings themselves. They are made not
only of flesh and blood but also of plastic and metal, of
silicon and lines of code.
An Application
Compared with methodological individualism, this con-
cept of agency has the important advantage that it en-
courages full consideration of the role of artificial intel-
ligence in those activities that include it. Artificial
intelligence works differently from human intelligence,
and that difference makes a difference in what is done,
how it is done, and what its implications are. This can
be demonstrated by the changes that are occurring in the
American legal profession as a result of the introduction
of the automated mode of information management.6
Information stored in artificial memory is simulta-
neously the necessary food and a potential poison for a
system of common law.7 The doctrine of stare decisis
directs that cases be decided in a manner consistent with
decisions on similar previous cases. Attorneys and judges
therefore rely on published records of past cases and legal
analyses to identify precedent for the case before them
and to frame and evaluate arguments according to more
or less settled principles of law. With the passage of time,
the number of decided cases obviously increases. If they
all are considered as potential precedent, the sheer mass
of information stored in artificial memory grows beyond
the capacity of any attorney or judge to control, and the
edifice of common law threatens to collapse under its
own weight.
Near the end of the nineteenth century the West Pub-
lishing Company developed a powerful indexing system
that organized the law in a taxonomic hierarchy of over
400 topics and upwards of 40,000 subtopics, each iden-
tified by a unique “key number.” Professionals employed
by West classified the issues treated in all published
cases according to this system. Consulting indexes or-
ganized according to the classification scheme, research-
ers could readily locate judicial opinions relevant to their
needs among thousands of state and federal cases. Some
analysts have argued that “the systematization involved
in the West key number system may be largely respon-
sible for rendering the common law manageable enough
to survive in the United States” (Grossman 1994:79; see
also Berring 1987:25).
Framing this in terms of the concepts introduced
above, the agencies associated with legal research op-
erated within the textual and oral mode of information
management. As for the textual mode, human intelli-
gence represented by West classifiers processed infor-
mation stored in artificial memory (printed documents)
to arrange it in the system’s categories, and other human
6. For a more detailed treatment of the impact of automation on
legal research, see Hanson (2002).
7. Medieval English law explicitly shifted from reliance on “living
memory” (the memory of the oldest living person) to written re-
cords by a statute in 1275. This has been called the “formal begin-
ning of the era of artificial memory” (Grossman 1994:4).
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intelligence represented by attorneys and judges pro-
cessed that classified information to construct briefs, ar-
guments, and opinions. In the oral mode, classifiers, lit-
igators, and judges regularly drew on information stored
in their own (human) memories in making decisions and
in discussing or debating issues with each other.
But published case law continued to expand until, by
the early 1960s, American lawyers were again finding its
management an intolerable burden. In the mid-1960s the
Ohio State Bar Association formed a group to explore
whether the aid of computers could be enlisted. They
learned of a system designed to help the Air Force man-
age its huge files of procurement contracts and reached
an agreement with its developers to modify the system
to suit their needs. After a shaky start, Mead Data Cen-
tral introduced the computerized legal research service
LEXIS for nationwide marketing in 1973. The West Pub-
lishing Company, accustomed for decades to dominance
in the legal publishing market, came out with the com-
petitor WESTLAW in 1975. Initially clumsy, by 1983 or
1984 WESTLAW had become an automated research ser-
vice equal in power to LEXIS (Harrington 1984–85:543,
547–54).
LEXIS and WESTLAW place case law, legal treatises,
encyclopedias, and law journals on CD-ROM and online
databases that can be automatically searched with Bool-
ean keyword queries. The impact on legal research has
been immense. Manual research using “the books” was
made obsolete as it became possible to do in minutes
what had previously required hours of tedious work.
However, computerized legal research is more than do-
ing the same thing as before only faster. Now the au-
tomated mode of information management is also in
play, as artificial intelligence processes (searches) infor-
mation stored in artificial memory in the form of digi-
talized databases. Therefore the agencies that conduct
legal research have changed, and this has important im-
plications for how research findings are used and even
for the profession of law itself.
The crucial point is that the automated mode replaces
the textual mode’s activity of classifying and searching
for legal information. In fact, with automation it is pos-
sible to bypass entirely the key number system’s essen-
tial step of classification of legal documents by human
analysts. Instead of classifying, artificial intelligence op-
erates best by indexing—connecting a symbol for a par-
ticular topic (generally in the form of an image or a word)
with whatever material is pertinent to it in some body
of information. Using an index enables one to retrieve
information about a topic from the contents of the book
or a collection of articles such as the Reader’s Guide.
Textual-mode indexes were constructed by human be-
ings. But computers can index without the participation
of human analysts. To search an electronic database for
a keyword is, after all, nothing but constructing an index
of the database for the word. Indeed, artificial intelli-
gence far surpasses human intelligence when it comes
to indexing. Search engines find thousands of matches
for words or phrases in electronic databases of millions
of documents in less than a second. The great majority
of printed documents do not even have indexes, so re-
trieving information from them by that method is out
of the question. In contrast, any document stored in an
electronic database can be searched by keyword. Those
print documents that do have indexes can be searched
only for the topics and terms that have been selected by
the people who indexed them. With automation, users
can search documents for words and phrases of their own
choosing; LEXIS and WESTLAW recognize many oper-
ators that allow for extremely precise searching.
Perhaps in line with the general goal of making arti-
ficial intelligence mirror human intelligence as closely
as possible, numerous attempts have been made to de-
sign programs that can classify.8 These, however, have
met with limited success because artificial intelligence
does not cope well with metaphor, synonyms, homo-
nyms, nuances of meaning, and levels of generalization.
Because computers are so much better at the one than
the other, classification declines and indexing ascends
in the automated environment for the purpose of ac-
cessing information.9
This has an effect on the way people think. Classifi-
cation presents people with information in the form of
preestablished understandings about how the things of
the world relate to each other. People are encouraged to
think in terms of given categories—to think in a settled,
uniform way. Indexing is a more unruly activity that
produces information in an ad hoc, open-ended, problem-
specific, user-controlled manner. People must use their
own devices to determine, among the results of a key-
word search, what is relevant and what is garbage and
to interpret what they have found. Thus indexing en-
courages flexibility and creativity rather than uniformity
of thought (see Bolter 1991:22).
Before automation, legal research relied heavily on
classification schemes, and this was reflected in legal
thinking (Berring 1986, 1987, 1994). Legal information
management devices such as the West key number sys-
tem, treatises, and encyclopedias are all designed to bring
order and accessibility to the large, unwieldy, and grow-
ing body of published case law. Moreover, the order they
bring is achieved by hierarchical, taxonomic classifica-
tion, the hallmark of which is that concrete particulars
are organized as representatives of abstract generaliza-
tions. The general categories that began as heads of the
taxonomic schemes for classifying legal information
8. Among these are Scorpion (Shafer n.d.), Northern Light (Ward
1999), Vivisimo (http://vivisimo.com), the Cyc Project (Reed and
Lenat 2002), and the Semantic Web (Berners-Lee, Hendler, and Las-
sila 2002, Schwartz 2002). Many of these are still under develop-
ment, and all of them fall well short of human capacities to classify.
9. The appeal of classification dies hard, however. WESTLAW’s
analysts still classify new cases according to the key number sys-
tem. They have recently introduced a tool called KeySearch, which
is actually a shell over the traditional key number system. Key-
Search translates the terms selected by the user into index topics
in the key number system and then searches for cases that have
been indexed with those key numbers, almost exactly as people
used to do manually. Playing on one of Robert Berring’s titles,
“Backing into the Future” (1986), the introduction of KeySearch
strikes me as an example of advancing into the past.
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have been reified into principles thought to preside over
“the law,” understood as a self-contained, independently
existing system. In the humanities and social sciences
published literature is generally taken to present a va-
riety of arguments and points of view, and the notion of
absolute truth seldom comes up. But in law, Berring
holds, the assumption is that the truth is out there, and
with proper research one can learn what it is (1994:14).
As Calvin Coolidge wrote in 1919, “men do not make
laws. But they do discover them” (Schwartz 1993:460).
The key number system in particular, Berring argues,
enjoyed a significance extending far beyond mere case
retrieval. “It provided a paradigm for thinking about the
law itself. Lawyers began to think according to the West
categories” (Berring 1986:33; see also Bintliff 1996:343).10
The medium is the message: a technique for managing
information became a major factor in the development
of a particular conception of the nature of the law.
The same assumptions are embedded in legal educa-
tion. The basic first-year law-school curriculum, intro-
duced in the latter nineteenth century by Christopher
Columbus Langdell at Harvard and taken up by virtually
all American law schools, was designed according to the
same basic categories of the law that informed the West
digests. Having been immersed in these categories both
in their training and in their ongoing legal research, even-
tually lawyers took what were actually organizing de-
cisions of Langdell and the West Publishing Company
to be the intrinsic structure of the law (Berring 1994:
22–23; Bast and Pyle 2001:287). That they are, instead,
one way of organizing a particular body of legal infor-
mation—that associated with American common law—
is evident from the fact that lawyers in Louisiana, with
its civil law system, are often frustrated by the distor-
tions that result from West’s efforts to classify their cases
according to its key numbers (Kent McKeever, interview,
November 6, 2001).
The distinctive management of information in the law
also contributes to its traditional isolation from other
fields of endeavor. The means of organizing and access-
ing legal information and its use in the practice of the
common law have traditionally been entirely self-refer-
ential. The importance of precedent and jurisdictional
authority results in cases’ being argued and decided with
reference to other cases, ideally in the same jurisdiction,
with little attention to extralegal considerations. Charles
Collier describes how the case method restricts thought
to purely legal channels. “A classic pattern or ‘formula’
for doctrinal scholarship emerges: (1) state the problem;
(2) propose a solution; (3) show how the common law,
properly reinterpreted, affords the proposed solution.
Here the influence of and connection with Langdelli-
anism must be noted. A central implication of Langdell’s
case method was that, in the study of law, one need not
venture beyond appellate judicial opinions” (1991:200).
10. Berring’s effusiveness regarding the impact of the West classi-
fication system on the structure of American law is not shared by
everyone. For a thoughtful rejoinder, see Schanck (1990:17–19).
The system is largely self-contained, citations to sources
outside the law being relatively rare.
The law’s peculiar way of operating has been rein-
forced by parochial training. Traditionally, law schools
have tended to keep aloof from other schools in the uni-
versity. They usually have their own buildings. The law
library is separate from other university libraries and
contains almost exclusively legal materials. The segre-
gation of students has been nearly total. Undergraduate
programs in law are rare. Law courses are peopled nearly
exclusively by law students, who in turn take nothing
outside the law school. In my own institution at least,
law courses are listed in a separate catalog and the law
school even follows a different academic calendar from
the rest of the university. Little wonder that lawyers,
immersed for three years in this separate world, go forth
in the conviction that the law is a domain unto itself.
The introduction of automated techniques has had a
transforming effect on all of this. Results produced by
Boolean keyword searches of full texts in computerized
databases are not presented with any taxonomic, hier-
archical organization. They are simply lists of docu-
ments that contain matches with the query, sorted per-
haps for relevance by criteria such as the position and/
or frequency of the query string in them. The most
far-reaching consequence of this is a transformation in
the conceptualization of the law (Berring 1986:29, 33).
Lawyers who regularly use LEXIS and WESTLAW are
being weaned away from the hierarchical categories em-
bedded in the traditional research tools. They are coming
to think of the law as a collection of facts and principles
that can be assembled in a variety of ways for different
purposes (Bintliff 1996:345–46). This could call into
question the notion that the law actually has an intrin-
sic, hierarchical organization, and that would signal a
basic change in the perception of legal knowledge and
of the law itself (Katsh 1989:221–22).
Theorists differ as to the significance of this shift.
Some hold that automated research is conducive to cre-
ative work and the discovery of new precedent. When
everyone utilized the same treatises, the West key num-
ber system, and other manual research tools, opposing
attorneys would tend to develop their arguments on the
basis of the cases regularly cited in them, nearly all of
which were familiar to judges and experts in that field
of law (Bintliff 1996:343–44). In contrast, keyword
searches with LEXIS and WESTLAW produce different
results depending on precisely how the searcher for-
mulates the query. As John Henry Merryman propheti-
cally wrote in 1977, “One of the most attractive features
of the LEXIS system . . . is that it liberates the researcher
from [preestablished] indexes and opens up an enormous
range of possible avenues of access to the literature”
(1977:426).11 In effect, with every keyword search the
11. As Bowker and Star put it (1999:292), “In opposition to the old
hierarchical databases, where relations between classes had to be
decided once and for all at the time of original creation, many
databases today incorporate object-oriented views of data whereby
different attributes can be selected and combined on the fly for
different purposes.”
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user creates a new index of the text. Therefore the ca-
pacity to use a text for purposes other than the author’s
or indexer’s is much greater with keyword searching
than with classification or a print index. Roberta Shaffer
stressed this aspect when asked what appealed to her
about online research. “Being liberated,” she replied.
“Having the choice between looking at something using
someone else’s taxonomy, like an indexer or a West Key
Number system, versus letting your own mind create
the taxonomies. With the books, you don’t have the free-
dom to think of it the way you think of it. You’re con-
strained by how somebody else chose to present it”
(quoted in Halvorson 2000:114–15).
The expansion of agency in legal research to include
artificial intelligence does not mean that the role of hu-
man intelligence is correspondingly restricted. On the
contrary, human intelligence has more latitude than be-
fore. Previously people were more constrained to think
within the framework of a classification scheme such as
the key number system. The greater freedom highlighted
by Shaffer stems from the indexing technique of artificial
intelligence, which presents human intelligence with a
greater diversity of information to evaluate and analyze.
This increased diversity means that the attention of dif-
ferent attorneys working on the same issue may be
drawn to different and occasionally unfamiliar cases as
precedent for the case at hand, and their arguments are
therefore less likely to be isomorphic. For Berring, this
has the potential to burst the bonds of conservatism and
generate a dynamic that will breathe new life into the
common law as opposing attorneys propose different
cases as precedent and judges are forced to take novel
information into account as they formulate their opin-
ions (1986:56; 1994:32–37; see also Katsh 1989:20).
Other legal scholars regard the situation with a more
jaundiced eye. They fear that it may foster bad law as
some attorneys overemphasize the role of artificial in-
telligence and neglect the essential place of human in-
telligence in research. Attorneys may, they suggest, un-
critically amass staggering numbers of precedents and
literature citations and consider that their job ends there,
failing to apply their human intelligence sufficiently at
the point where it is indispensable: the development of
thoughtful arguments based on careful application of le-
gal principles (Lien 1998:88–89; Krause 1993:576; Selya
1994:408; Munday 1983).
Beyond the loosening of the law’s internal organization
and procedures, there is evidence that the membrane
that isolates the law is becoming more permeable (Pos-
ner 1987). Judges today, for example, are citing more non-
legal sources in their opinions. Schauer and Wise (2000)
examined all citations in U.S. Supreme Court opinions
at five-year intervals from 1960 to 1990 and then for each
year from 1990 to 1998. While the trajectory is by no
means smooth, they found a distinct increase in the pro-
portion of citations to nonlegal material. Samplings from
the Supreme Court of New Jersey and other courts
showed a similar pattern. Their analysis centers on the
ease of electronic searching. “In previously barely imag-
ined ways the universe of nonlegal information is now
easily and cheaply available to lawyers, judges, and other
legal decision makers. What once would have required
a 2-hour journey now requires only the click of a mouse,
and this may well provide the most persuasive expla-
nation of the phenomenon we have identified” (p. 513).
This explanation is bolstered by the fact that there is a
definite increase in citations to wide-circulation news-
papers (p. 503), which judges and their clerks have been
able to access easily in the NEXIS database for nearly 20
years and which have also recently become available on
the Internet. Schauer and Wise refer to the growing in-
filtration of nonlegal information as the “delegalization
of law” (p. 515).
Law schools are also becoming less insular. Many law
faculty members now engage in interdisciplinary re-
search and writing (Kissam 1986:297–99, 318–19), and
law schools are increasingly hiring faculty members who
do not have law degrees and who teach courses outside
the traditional boundaries of the law (Hanson 2002:
590–91). They now frequently participate in interdisci-
plinary programs that offer Master’s degrees in other
fields such as public policy or economics as well as the
J.D. Newer law journals, such as the Ecology Law Quar-
terly, Law and Sexuality, and the Southern California
Interdisciplinary Law Journal, have distinctly interdis-
ciplinary orientations. Of course, this is a two-way street.
Automation began earlier and has proceeded farther in
law than in many other disciplines, where, for example,
online versions of full-text journal articles are only now
becoming common. The rich trove of easily accessible
information is a strong enticement for nonlawyers to
incorporate legal materials into their own research (Han-
son 2002:589–92).
The law is changing both in its relations to outside
fields and in its internal practices of conducting research
and assembling information. A theme common to all
these changes is that the fixed categories reflective of
classification are giving way to more flexible thinking
associated with indexing. And that shift is attributable
to the prominent place that the automated mode of in-
formation management has assumed in the law.
Conclusion
A methodological individualist strategy that seeks to ex-
plain all social behavior in terms of the drives, inten-
tions, and other characteristics of human individuals is
no longer tenable. Full understanding of what is going
on requires a superorganic model that recognizes that
the oral and textual modes of information management
are now routinely supplemented by the automated mode.
This in no way banishes human beings from the scene.
Their role continues to be indispensable; in fact, it is
often expanded. In the law, for example, people design
computer searches, interpret the results, cite sources, ar-
gue about what constitutes precedent, write articles,
plan expanded law-school curricula, decide to hire fac-
ulty with new qualifications, and so on. Nevertheless,
because of the participation of artificial intelligence,
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such activities should be explained in terms of superor-
ganic, extended agencies that include but are not limited
to human individuals. These agencies pursue activities
differently from unassisted humans and with different
outcomes. To generalize from our case study of the law,
it appears that the inclusion of artificial intelligence in
agency significantly increases the amount of information
that must be taken into consideration, places greater de-
mands on human intelligence to evaluate the relevance
of that information, and encourages greater flexibility
and creativity in its interpretation.
Comments
christ ian ghasarian
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The relationship between individuals and their culture
and society has been debated since the emergence of the
social sciences as a discipline. An important issue has
been the scope of individuals’ autonomy from or depen-
dence on the systems of ideas, beings, and objects sur-
rounding them. Hanson’s paper contributes to the debate
in a very interesting manner through an analysis of the
new situations created by the development of artificial
intelligence and automated forms of information in con-
temporary societies. He argues that methodological in-
dividualism, which seeks to explain social behavior in
terms of the drives and intentions of the agent, is no longer
adequate for understanding the complex processes that are
taking place. According to him, the increase of informa-
tion and artificial intelligence necessitates that human
activities be considered part of a “new superorganic.”
Hanson distinguishes three modes of information
management—oral, textual, and automated—and sug-
gests that the emergence of this last mode requires a
rethinking of the issue of agency that takes artificial in-
telligence into account. His concept of concrete “ex-
tended agencies,” which today include human individ-
uals but are not limited to them, interestingly does not
view these individuals as overwhelmed by the system.
In the context of the automation of information, new
forms of action can take place, which, he argues, enhance
the possibilities for individuals in that they require more
flexibility and creativity than ever.
The idea that, in a new superorganic, human potential
is not lost in the automated mode of dealing with in-
formation expresses a rather optimistic perspective on
human evolution. Clearly, many concrete advantages for
humans are associated with the automation of infor-
mation, among them classifying, comparing, searching,
etc., at a speed that would be impossible with human
intelligence alone. Hanson is right about this, and his
concept of a new superorganic seems appropriate for
identifying the new situations in which we find our-
selves. Yet, the new flexibility and creativity allowed in
this new context of action is accompanied by the reduc-
tion of other ways of dealing with the surrounding world
and learning from it. A whole dimension of human ac-
tion in and on the environment, that of the senses, is
gradually being set aside.
While Hanson is correct that the automation of infor-
mation favors a certain quality of life, one cannot deny
that it also participates in the marginalization of what is
called “direct experience.” The more humans participate
in extended agencies, the less they directly process the
information they deal with. This may be quite useful in
some domains of activity, such as the production of in-
formation, but in the process humans are losing other
faculties. Societies that are not yet confronted with the
expansion and generalization of the automated mode of
information still require from their members direct con-
tacts with what they are dealing with, be it nature, kin,
ancestors and spirits in other realms of reality, or some-
thing else.
Several dimensions of the human potential to act and
to learn through the senses and personal experience are
still part of the everyday life of members of cultures that
value the observation-reproduction of the practices of el-
ders and others. These dimensions of direct apprenticeship
through imitation and reproduction are of course also pre-
sent in new-superorganic societies, but the recourse to
artificial intelligence and the automated, indirect way of
dealing with information are rapidly increasing in them.
Marketing, commodification, mass consumerism, finan-
cial profit, etc., require numerous extended agencies; ef-
ficiency in these matters requires more than what unaided
and slow human action can do.
Since Kroeber first wrote on the superorganic, a complex
process of change in human life has taken place. We al-
ready see two types of societies distinguished in terms of
the type of agency involved—(more) human or (more) ex-
tended. Those that develop more and more automated
ways of being produce different types of humans from
those in which action is based on what is directly available
to individuals (the body, other individuals, and tools). Be-
yond the gap between types of societies, Hanson’s analysis
implicitly points to the emergence of two ways of being
human. Increasing some capacities (through “extended
agencies”) while losing other forms of creativity and flex-
ibility, notably that of experiencing the world through the
body (“personal agency”), contributes to the reduction of
the human experience of life. Without returning to meth-
odological individualism, this situation requires studies
pointing out the other side of the new superorganic.
david hakken
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Hanson is one of several anthropologists who take se-
riously the idea that the recent deployment of automated
information technologies has transformed social dynam-
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ics and, further, that the implications of these transfor-
mations should impact, inter alia, anthropology’s un-
derstanding of culture. His article properly critiques the
distortions imposed by presumptions of methodological
individualism on the issue of agency, an issue to which
he assigns appropriate philosophical as well as anthro-
pological importance. Like a good cyberspace ethnogra-
pher, Hanson makes a set of investigable empirical
claims, the central one being that the artificial intelli-
gence fostered by the new technologies is the driver be-
hind the changed dynamics in social formation repro-
duction that in turn demand the re-appreciation of
trans-individual agency implied by the notion of a “new
superorganic.”
While Hanson’s critique of the “old” superorganic
might have been more fully developed, I find no reason
to dissent from his initial positions. His illustrative case,
the transformation in the practice of law, is an excellent
ground on which to test the basic empirical issue of cy-
berspace studies—the extent to which the clear potential
of social transformation is actualized in practice. None-
theless, I will dissent from several specific aspects of his
argument. Hanson gives a very useful survey of the sev-
eral literatures that critique the modernist ontological
privileging of the individual. As is clear from this survey,
several of these critiques—especially those developed
around actor network theory, with which I am most fa-
miliar—have either no connection to automatic infor-
mation technologies or only a moderate one. There are
definitely good reasons to believe that the critique of
doctrinaire individualist agency has been given substan-
tial impetus by cyber-events (the debate in the 1990s over
cyber-rape is a good example), but critique need not be
made on these grounds. In a similar manner, popular
concern over community in cyberspace has led to a re-
thinking of social science theorizing on this important
topic, but this does not prove that it is cyberspace itself
that changes the basic dynamics of community.
Regarding Hanson’s assertions that the practice of law
in the United States has changed, I agree that there is a
clearly discernible pattern of increased interchange be-
tween legal and social science scholarship, that lawyers
do more online searching, that WESTLAW’s practice
manifests certain modernist proclivities, and that there
is now more frustration with WESTLAWed law. These
associations do not, however, confirm the causal links
he argues for. The decision of the Supreme Court to rely
on social science data in Brown v. Board of Education
was only the first of many cases fostering cross-disci-
plinary discourse. The powerful popular critique of legal
practice is paralleled by a similar critique of medicine.
Both of these patterns have no obvious connection with
automated information technologies.
It is true that “brute force” machine indexes can re-
place human coding of texts. The problem of machine
indexing is that all occurrences of a word are of equal
relevance, with the result that, even if weighted by num-
ber of occurrences, searches using such tools are much
more likely to produce “false hits.” In his footnote 9
Hanson acknowledges movement toward the “hybrid”
systems, combining machine indexing with human cod-
ing, that Pfaffenberger (1990) describes as dominant in
the world of general libraries.
Hanson needs to make a stronger empirical case that
the law is so very different. In particular, he needs to
avoid the tendency, so rampant in cyber-hype, to take
the potential for transformative change as indicative of
its actuality. Given that many of his references to
changes in the practice of law are drawn from the mid-
1980s, I suspect that they are more reflective of “early-
uptake enthusiasm” than of an institutionalized “new
paradigm.”
At a more general level, Hanson, like many computer
scientists, tends to equate data processing with intelli-
gence, blurring the difference between information and
knowledge. This trope was popular among corporations
trying to market “knowledge management” technolo-
gies, but the trope disappeared, along with the marketing,
just before the bursting of the dot.com bubble. As I have
shown (Hakken 2003), they were replaced by “knowledge
management fatigue syndrome.” Were we to become a
“knowledge society,” a much higher, even transforma-
tive degree of collective agency would likely be manifest.
Automated information technologies may become part
of distinctly new ways of networking knowledge, but
they will be very different from those that merely “mine
data.” I find the work of the technology philosopher Al-
bert Borgmann (e.g., 1999) a more satisfying account of
the relationship of information and agency. Borgmann
shares my skepticism about the implications of tech-
nologizing information and is equally alive to its pitfalls
and its potentials. Hanson may well be right, but I re-
main to be convinced. Let the ethnography decide!
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I am charmed to see Hanson illustrating such a theo-
retical and far-reaching issue in social science with such
a mundane example as the case law research methods
from my own much-disparaged field. However, despite
the boldness of his approach and the creativity of his
insights, I think that he dismisses methodological in-
dividualism too quickly, that his proposed alternative is
too vague and complicated, and that his discussion of
legal research illustrates the problems with the meth-
odology that he proposes rather than the one he
criticizes.
Although methodological individualism is a reasona-
bly well-defined approach to social theory, it is not a
theory but a premise that underlies a variety of theories.
One of these is rational actor theory. For a majority of
social scientists, this theory fails to account for a variety
of human behaviors and social institutions in precisely
the way Hanson describes. But methodological individ-
ualism is also the basis of phenomenology, which avoids
these defects and possesses significant advantages. Ac-
cording to Husserl (1962), all social action arises from
478 F current anthropology Volume 45, Number 4, August–October 2004
individual behavior, and all thought is located in the
conscious minds of discrete individuals. Because human
beings can communicate through language, however,
they are capable of creating intersubjective understand-
ings, that is, shared ideas that are stable and cumulative
over time. The coordination of these ideas among indi-
viduals produces social traditions and institutions. In
fact, human thought at anything above the most pri-
mordial level is possible only because intersubjective un-
derstandings provide an interpretive structure for the in-
dividual. Husserl is the originator of the idea, now so
prominent in social science, that the human perception
of reality is socially constructed.
Husserl’s approach is preferable to theories that ascribe
autonomous action to social collectivities because it is
more rigorous and ultimately provides a more satisfac-
tory account of social action. Of course, it is often useful
to describe institutions, nations, or mass movements as
social actors, but this is verbal shorthand and leaves im-
portant matters unexplained. We can say, for example,
that a school of fishes turns away from an oncoming
shark, but we have a much more convincing account of
the observed behavior if we can explain what motivated
each individual fish and how these individual actions
were coordinated.
Hanson seems correct in saying that artificial intelli-
gence can produce nonhuman entities that are capable
of independent action. Phenomenology does not deny
this, any more than it would deny that a fish is capable
of independent behavior. But neither the fish nor the
computer negates phenomenology’s account of human
action, and Hanson moves a bit too quickly from the
possibility of genuine artificial intelligence to a descrip-
tion of a computer-based indexing system as part of an
emergent entity that includes its human users. The dis-
placement of West’s pre-set key-note system by the more
fluid word search system of LEXIS and WESTLAW has
certainly changed the way lawyers construct their un-
derstanding of decided cases (Berring 1987). But this
change is explicable by the simpler and more rigorous
method of phenomenology, which suggests that collec-
tively developed means of communication affect our in-
tersubjective understandings. In fact, this is essentially
the approach Hanson employs. Although he proposes a
theory of extended agency, his explanation for the impact
of technology is framed in terms of the way it affects the
conceptual frameworks of individual decision makers.
The problem with such a complex, highly metaphor-
ical departure from methodological individualism as the
one Hanson proposes is that not only is it difficult to
use but the effort to use it creates the tendency to over-
simplify other aspects of the issue under consideration.
Hanson uses his theory to explain how judges identify
prior decisions “to frame and evaluate arguments ac-
cording to more or less settled principles of law.” But
the idea that judges are guided by prior decisions is a
very conventional model of legal decision making. Po-
litical scientists argue that judicial decisions are con-
trolled by ideology (Segal and Spaeth 1993) or strategic
considerations (Epstein and Knight 1998), while legal
scholars engage in an extensive debate about the com-
plex ways that doctrine is deployed in conjunction with
these and other factors (Dworkin 1986, Feeley and Rubin
1998, Fiss 1982). In addition, judicial decision making is
an increasingly small part of our legal system; the ad-
ministrative state has produced new ways of thinking
about law that are quite remote from the one Hanson
describes (Rubin n.d.). A public health inspector search-
ing online reports from restaurants to decide which ones
to inspect would be using the computer in a rather dif-
ferent way from the one Hanson discusses.
Of course, Hanson is offering only one example from
a very large field, but that is exactly Husserl’s point.
Since all understanding is ultimately located in the hu-
man mind, unnecessarily complex methodologies are
likely to overload our conceptual capacities and thereby
do us a disservice. Thus, the phenomenological view of
human beings, in good hermeneutic fashion, provides an
argument for using that very same view as a mode of
explanation.
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Hanson challenges us to rethink the concepts of mind
and agency to incorporate artificial intelligence as a pro-
cessual component of human action. In spite of a ven-
erable tradition of theory centered on the action of in-
dividuals, Hanson reminds us of classical and more
recent critiques of methodological individualism and, by
extension, universal renderings of the human subject.
Appealing to Bateson’s cybernetic communication and
Haraway’s cyborgs, Hanson argues that our dependence
on computers and information sciences necessitates
broadening our view of agency to recognize the indepen-
dent potential of information systems to act in a manner
that is not simply an extension of human individuals
and human intelligence. He encourages us, therefore, in
a manner reminiscent of Kroeber’s critique of “organic”
models of culture, to embrace a “new superorganic” that
renders obsolete theoretical models grounded exclu-
sively in individuals and human intelligence. There is
little doubt that his imaginative uses of the superorganic
will generate controversy, as I suspect that many scholars
like myself are not quite prepared to attribute agency to
artificial intelligence.
Although Hanson’s critique of methodological indi-
vidualism is cogent and his support for an expanded
agency well argued, I believe that his conclusions share
some of the same faults that were present in Kroeber’s
original formulation of the superorganic. As did Kroeber,
he pays insufficient attention to the concrete and his-
torical positioning of human agents, or co-subjects, and
thus glosses over the issue of power, especially the tech-
nical and political uses of information sciences. He es-
sentially takes up the philosophical and anthropological
oversights of privileging individuals as the unit of anal-
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ysis without addressing their origins. According to Heller
(1981), the emphasis on individuals as significant agents
and thus units of analysis emerged gradually during the
Renaissance in association with universal reason and,
perhaps most important, individualized proprietary
rights that would, in turn, become the foundation of
modern civil society. MacPherson (1962) has referred to
the individualization of proprietary rights as “possessive
individualism,” thus giving a concrete political cast to
what otherwise could be understood in abstract philo-
sophical or psychological terms. The critical challenge
to the social science celebration of individuals follows,
therefore, from identifying relations between cultural
and methodological emphases on individuals and the for-
mation of modern civil society. While Hanson’s refer-
ences to Althusser and Foucault are suggestive of such
a historically sensitive critique of methodological indi-
vidualism, the associations of the “possessive individ-
ual” with the political formation of capitalist society are
left undeveloped. Consequently, the issue of power so
important to the works of Althusser and Foucault re-
mains unaddressed.
Likewise, the abstract association of cybernetic sys-
tems and artificial intelligence with human agency never
really takes up the implications of such an expanded
domain of agency for co-subjects which are differenti-
ated. While Hanson is less concerned with particular
subjects than with the nature of “agency” reformulated
to incorporate artificial intelligence, he does emphasize
their interrelations, and thus one cannot avoid the im-
plications for theory of a generic subject. Ironically, the
notion of the generic subject takes us down the same
path as the methodological individualism that Hanson
critiques. It does not enable us to pursue the group dy-
namics from which social life is contested or the resis-
tance to systemic exploitation and domination, nor does
it allow us to pursue the differentiated social foundations
upon which the autonomy of cybernetic systems ulti-
mately depends.
Finally, the fact that Hanson does not take up human
agency as differentiated prevents him, I believe, from
evaluating artificial intelligence as an “agency” related
to commodity production. While artificial intelligence
ostensibly operates independently of parameters that are
initially humanly established, we should not lose sight
of artificial intelligence as a human product and there-
fore a commodity. The analogy (or, perhaps, literal equiv-
alence), between artificial intelligence and commodities
is important in that Marx argued (as would Althusser)
that the fetishism of commodities leads to their seeming
independence from human labor. In fact, economics has
made a science of studying the independent circulation
of commodities at the expense of human labor and class
relations of production and consumption. Although
there is much potentially to admire in the uses of arti-
ficial intelligence and computer technology, when arti-
ficial intelligence is regarded as an agent independent of
its being an object of human labor we risk overlooking
its relation to human labor, the differential access of var-
ious groups to its benefits, and its potential uses as a
medium of surveillance and social control. Again, al-
though surveillance and social control were paramount
to Foucault’s panopticon, their relation to agency is not
broached by Hanson. Therefore, just as Kroeber’s influ-
ential notion of the superorganic failed to address sub-
jects who are positioned and differentiated, this in my
estimation is the principal fault of the “new super-
organic.”
Reply
f . allan hanson
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I am grateful to the four colleagues for the time and effort
they have taken to comment so thoughtfully on my es-
say. Their remarks seem to fall into two general cate-
gories. Hakken and Rubin doubt that a strong enough
case has been made to sustain my notion of a new su-
perorganic, while Ghasarian and Ulin are concerned
about the effect of the theory on certain crucial prop-
erties of the human individual.
Hakken suggests that the essay overemphasizes the
impact of automation. He has no problem with jettison-
ing methodological individualism, but he doubts that the
advent of automation requires it. My use of actor net-
work theory is suspect, for example, because while it
does challenge methodological individualism it is often
on the basis of cases that do not involve automation.
Judicial decisions incorporated evidence from outside the
law, such as the use of social scientific data in the 1954
Supreme Court decision in Brown v Board of Education,
well before LEXIS and WESTLAW came on the scene. It
is not my intention to claim that automation alone ne-
cessitates the concept of extended agency. It has been
needed for a long time. My reference to actor network
theory is intended more to make that general point than
to say anything specific about automation. This is why
the main example in my discussion of actor network
theory is John Law’s analysis of fifteenth-century Por-
tuguese voyages of exploration. Nor do I claim that com-
puter-assisted research methods are solely responsible
for broadening legal thinking. “Brandeis briefs,” which
use evidence drawn from outside the law, were intro-
duced in 1909 when Justice Brandeis drew upon social
science and statistics in his brief for Muller v Oregon
(Berring 2000:1688). But I do claim that the participation
of artificial intelligence in action has drawn attention
with special urgency to the necessity to develop a theory
of agency that goes beyond methodological individual-
ism. And I claim, further, that the concept of extended
agency that includes artificial as well as human intel-
ligence is important for understanding developments in
legal thinking and practice since the introduction of
LEXIS and WESTLAW.
Hakken (probably) and Rubin (certainly) are willing to
concede that automation has changed legal thinking, but
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neither is willing to buy the proposition that a new su-
perorganic theory of social action is necessary to explain
it. Rubin holds that it can be understood more simply
with Husserlian phenomenology. His description of that
theory is essentially the same as the one presented in
my essay under the name of “relational methodological
individualism”: while the ultimate entity that thinks
and acts is the human individual, what it thinks and
does can be fully understood only in the context of the
individual’s relationships with other individuals, with
cultural institutions, and with technology. Rubin would
therefore explain changes in legal thinking and practice
in terms of the influences of automated research pro-
cedures on individual lawyers, who alone are the think-
ing and acting agents, rather than incorporating those
procedures into agency itself. Perhaps the difference be-
tween us can be explained by how we approach the prob-
lem. I imagine that Rubin began with what is happening
in the law and decided that it could be explained most
simply in terms of phenomenological methodological in-
dividualism. That is certainly reasonable, but I addressed
the matter differently and arrived at a different conclu-
sion. My line of thought was to consider transgenic or-
ganisms, cyborgs, computerized expert systems that op-
erate without human supervision, computers that learn,
that play chess, that assist in the design and manufacture
of the next generation of computers, the effect of hy-
pertext on the concept of the author, and so on. I then
agreed with a number of writers, including Hakken
(1999:224), that we need to define agency in a way that
goes beyond the individual. Having redefined the think-
ing and acting subject as extended agency, I then con-
cluded that it could be applied to issues such as changes
in the law. Parsimony plays an important part here, be-
cause the same theory of agency applies, among other
things, to expert systems that draw up wills or track and
stock inventory, students looking up books in an online
catalog, what is going on in the law, and Portuguese voy-
ages of exploration in the fifteenth century.
Ghasarian wonders if the incorporation of artificial in-
telligence into agency diminishes the sensual, bodily
side of human experience. Although he appreciates that
automation may offer new opportunities for flexibility
and creativity in human cognition, he is concerned that
what is direct human sense experience of the world in
nonautomated societies becomes indirect—and therefore
less immediate and rich—in automated societies. He
hopes that this side of the issue will be investigated. I
hope so too, but I do not share his anticipation that such
studies will reveal that automation makes for grayer ex-
perience. In addition to his recommendation that such
studies be conducted in societies where automation has
not progressed far, I would hope that they would be done
in societies such as our own, where one thrust in the
development of automation is precisely to heighten sen-
sual experience. Beyond the thrill of computer games and
the titillation of lurid photographs, there are special gog-
gles and gloves designed to heighten the visual and tac-
tile experience of cybersex, violence, and risk-taking ad-
venture. As was asked about hallucinogenic drugs in
previous decades, one can ask now whether the enhance-
ments of hyperreality devalue or intensify sensual
experience.
Ulin claims that the new superorganic overemphasizes
the place of artificial intelligence and underemphasizes
the place of human subjects. It attributes too much in-
dependence to artificial intelligence—which is, after all,
a human product—and therefore misses the extent to
which it is a political tool for exploitation and control.
And it reduces the individual to a “generic subject,” in-
sufficiently recognizing the different positions of sur-
veillance, domination, and resistance that people hold
in systems of power. Ulin finds this ironic, because the
methodological individualism that I criticize is also sus-
ceptible to the notion of the generic subject. It is ironic
indeed, because the poststructuralist critique of the idea
of a constant subject characterized by unchanging hu-
man nature is one of the arguments I use against meth-
odological individualism as I develop my notion of the
new superorganic. What I cannot understand is why Ulin
thinks that extended agency entails a generic subject.
Variability in all its components, human as well as non-
human, is one of the defining features of extended
agency. It is built on the idea that different individuals
play different roles and even the same individuals play
different roles—in different circumstances (such as in the
examples of the blind man walking down the street and
reading Braille or the student looking up a book and dis-
cussing it with a friend). There is nothing in the theory
that obscures realization that some agencies engage in
domination or surveillance (as an FBI operation in ac-
cordance with the U.S.A. Patriot Act) and other agencies
resist it (the interaction of politically motivated hackers
with their computers comes to mind). The new
superorganic does not fail to recognize the differential
positions of human subjects; it encourages it.
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